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I. INTRODUCTION

The intrinsic nature of science and technology (S&T) is global and
increasingly collaborative with international partners. As a global
enterprise, S&T have not only added the commercial value of their
innovations to economic growth and development of both the United
States and other countries but have also addressed critical research areas
in biodiversity and the environment, global climate change and alternative
energy sources, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, international
oceans and fisheries, safety in chemical and biological terrorism,
nanotechnology, nuclear energy, and medical applications, all of which are
inherently transnational. In these areas of advanced research and
commercialization, the United States provides the needed global S&T
leadership that is driven largely by global market forces and domestic
political and economic realities.
For the United States, the Department of State negotiates and
administers government-to-government routine international S&T
frameworks or umbrella agreements with other countries. Seven U.S.
government departments and technical agencies directly administer over
five hundred ongoing S&T agreements. They also manage their own
implementing agreements with over fifty countries and more than twenty
international organizations and groups of organizations.' In 1997, for
example, the Department of State administered 33 broad international S&T
agreements and the Department of Energy managed 257 implementing
arrangements. Other specialized agencies like the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) maintained 127 implementing
arrangements. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) had 44. The
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) carried out 56. The
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) administered
32. And, the National Science Foundation (NSF) maintained 26. This
demonstrates both the global nature of science and technology
collaboration and the diverse and often complex relations within the U.S.
government and among other countries.
Generally, umbrella agreements address a wide range of broader S&T
issues within which technical agencies and their foreign counterparts agree
to undertake specific arrangements as beneficial to their missions. By
federal law, the Department of State has been given the authority to
oversee and coordinate international umbrella agreements and
implementing agreements by ensuring that such collaborative activities are

1. U.S. Gov't Accounting Office, SER. NO. GAO/RCED-99-108, INFORMATION ON
INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS (1999) (on file with the author).
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implemented in congruence with U.S. foreign policy.2 These umbrella

agreements and implementing agreements are the governing frameworks
for S&T-related international economic and trade policy, and their
relationships to the regimes of intellectual property rights (IPRs)3 have
increasingly become more complicated and contested, both domestically
and internationally.
II. GOVERNANCE OF DOMESTIC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Domestically, the influence of industrial and commercial interests and
the confluence of academic and scientific communities vary significantly.
At the time the U.S. Constitution was written, the protection of IPRs was
recognized "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 4 Thus, IPRs have not only
emerged as legal properties in the form of patents, copyrights, and
trademarks to promote American ingenuity and innovation, but they also
develop an equitable global trading system. The U.S. government requires
that the federally supported international S&T agreements be negotiated
by properly protecting intellectual properties.' In the Information Age,
however, IPR issues present a series of complex dilemmas for legislative,
scientific, and business communities.6 Yet, these communities generally
agree that the commercialization of scientific and technological
innovations positively associates with the recent growth in American
productivity and economic expansion. However, there still exists
recognition that the sharing of scientific information and knowledge
openly and freely is constrained by legislative and administrative
frameworks.7 In a more restrictive ownership of IPR regimes, several
fundamental questions are raised:

2. See Case-Zablocki Act of Aug. 22, 1972, (codified as amended at I U.S.C. § 112b
(1972)).
3. The meaning of "intellectual property" is explained in Article 2 of the Convention
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Convention Establishing the
World Intellectual Property Organization [hereinafter WIPO] (explaining the meaning of
intellectual property), availableathttp://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo029en.htm (last visited
May 12, 2004).
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
5. See 22 U.S.C. § 2656b.
6. NAT'L RESEARCI COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY iN THE
INFORMATION AGE (1999).
7. The Science, Technology, and Economic Policy Board at the National Academies takes
the leading role on these issues. Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy, available
at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2004).
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1. Who owns the science-related IPRs resulting from publicly funded
government owned and operated facilities or from research laboratories
operated by public universities such as the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory?
2. Should the technology-related IPRs be owned by the private sector
even though they are initially developed by government funded joint
venture projects?
3. Can we separate science (largely funded by the public sector) from
technology (mainly funded by private investment) when mutually
inclusive projects yield more innovations?
These and other important issues are cited in the National Research
Council's book, A Question of Balance.8 The policy framework to address
these three questions emanates from the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 where
nonprofit universities and laboratories, small business firms, and
nonfederal inventors are allowed to own the inventions resulting from
federally funded research projects.9 The U.S. government funded national
laboratories may also assign their rights to a sole or joint invention made
under a cooperative research and development agreement.' 0 However, if
a government contractor performs research under an international S&T
agreement, the U.S. government does not have the legal authority to assign
foreign rights in any invention produced in another country. There are,
however, some exceptions to this policy whereby the Bayh-Dole Act
allows the assignment on a case-by-case basis in "exceptional
circumstances."" The Act requires participating American nonprofit
organizations or small business firms to provide sub-licensing to a foreign
government pursuant to specific international agreements as reflected by
regulation. 2
In terms of public service employees' inventions, the U.S. government
generally owns the IPRs. 13 However, the government is required to make
the rights allocation by appealing to the Department of Commerce before
securing an assignment from the inventors. The regulation also allows
government employees to own IPRs if the government does not patent or
otherwise commercialize the invention. 4 A public employee's residual

8. NAT'L RESEARCH CoUNcIL, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC
INTEREST IN ScIENmTIFc AND TECHNICAL DATABASES (1999).

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See 35 U.S.C. § 202(e) (2000).
See Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(b)(1).
See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000); 37 C.F.R. § 401.3(b) (2003).
See 37 C.F.R. § 401.5 (2003).
See Exec. Order No. 10,096, 15 C.F.R. § 389 (Jan. 23, 1950); 37 C.F.R. § 501.
See 15 U.S.C. § 3710d (2000).
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rights may also preclude the U.S. government from transferring its rights
to another country where the government has not submitted an application
for patent. Overall, the Bayh-Dole Act and the Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1986 have served 15as a balancing mechanism between
academic and commercial interests.
III. GLOBAL

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES AND THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Internationally, a series of global treaties - the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property (1883),16 the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886), 1" and the Rome
Convention for the Performances, Phonograms, and Broadcasts (196 1)'8
- have been signed and updated many times since their inception. The
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), created in 1967,
administers these treaties. 19 However, the 1994 Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 20 which is
contained in the Legal Texts 2' that created the World Trade Organization

(WTO) in 1995, provides for the establishment and enforcement of
standards for IPR protection both nationally and internationally.
The WTO's TRIPS agreement covers the protection of eight types of
intellectual property rights: 1) copyright and related rights, 2) trademarks,
3) geographical indicators, 4) industrial designs, 5) patents, 6) plant variety
protection, 7) layout designs (topographies) of integrated circuits, and 8)
undisclosed information (trade secrets). In the context of U.S. international
economic policy, the protection of IPRs is an essential element of S&T
agreements and international trade negotiations. Thus, the federal
government is committed to its constitutional mandate to protect

15. See Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-517 § 6(a) (codified as 35 U.S.C. 5301-5307);
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 3710.
16. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, art. 5A, 21
U.S.T. 1583.
17. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221.
18. Rome Convention for the Performances, Phonograms, and Broadcasts, Oct. 26, 1961,496
U.N.T.S. 43; see Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 16.
19. WIPO, supra note 3.
20. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNEX IC, 1994 AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATED
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS) [hereinafter TRIPS], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/27-trips.pdf (last visited May 13, 2004).
21. See id.
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intellectual property.2 2 However, beyond the WTO framework, there are
several major issues in international S&T negotiations and implementing
arrangements that remain unresolved:
1. How do we resolve IPR issues in international S&T agreements when
there are countries with weak or noneffective IPR regimes of their
own?
2. Would the U.S. government's legal framework be effective in
protecting American innovations in light of proliferation of American
creativity and invention in the globalizing Information Revolution?
3. Can the WIPO and the WTO implement and enforce TRIPS
effectively?
The increasingly globalizing world, commercial interests, and shared
global challenges have no national boundaries. The Berne, Paris, and
Rome Conventions, implemented within the WIPO and WTO frameworks,
try to achieve their agreed objectives in respective IPR regimes. The WTO
has no real authority to effectively enforce S&T-related TRIPS issues,
especially those dealing with Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(MEAs), including the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity.2 3 These
unresolved issues have become the next agenda items in global trade
negotiations which the United States needs to proactively pursue in future
multilateral diplomacy.

IV. UNITED STATES FRAMEWORKS AND CHALLENGES

In the United States, several laws, rules, and procedures are in place to
protect IPR regimes. One of the main enforceable mechanisms deployed
by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is the annual Special 301
Review,2 4 which identifies countries with TRIPS violations. It can then
either bring those countries into the WTO jurisdiction or take other
bilateral actions to enforce the TRIPS rules. The USTR has raised a series

22. See DEP'TOF STATE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENTREPORT2001: MAKINGNEwTECHNOLOGIES
WORK FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, available at http://www.undp.org/hdro/papers/ocpapers

mendis.pdf (last visited May 13, 2004).
23. See TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILENNiUM (G.P. Sampson & W.B. Chambers
eds., 2002).
24. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is the basis for "Special 301." The review
procedures are also set forth in "Title VII" of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
and other trade laws such as "Super 301" and "Section 1377." Executive Order 13116 of March 31,
1999, also gives the USTR additional authority to enforce IPRs in international economic and trade
relations. See USTR, 2000 SPECiAL201 REPORT, availableat www.ustr.gov/html/special.html (last
visited May 13, 2004).
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of issues related to TRIPS violations in many countries that have S&T
agreements with the United States.2"
The Special 301 law and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(which implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty 26 ) not only serve as a safeguard but
they also highlight the importance of IPR protection under the rules of
international law. The USTR recognizes that TRIPS is the most detailed
and comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property yet
negotiated as a single text that established both enforceable standards and
settlement mechanism.2" In cooperation with the WTO, WIPO, and the
World Bank, U.S. government agencies (especially the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the Department of the Treasury, the Patent and
Trademark Office, and the USTR) provide technical assistance for
capacity building, facilitate the creation of legal frameworks, and
collaborate with law enforcement agencies in other countries.
A. Role of the Departmentof State
The Case-Zablocki Act of 1972 serves as a policy framework for
fulfilling the Secretary of State's responsibility to pursue a coherent
foreign policy in international S&T partnerships.28 The circular-175
authorization process (known as the C- 175 process) is the mechanism that
provides for coordination and policy guidance to implement S&T
agreements.29 The guidance related to intellectual property issues in the
international S&T negotiation process derives from the 1990 Model IPR
Annex in the C-175 process,3 ° which has raised two major interrelated
issues with American trading partners.
The geographicallocationclause (Article IIB2a in the 1990 Model IPR
Annex) states that each of the partner countries "shall be entitled to obtain
'all rights' and interests"(and by extension the commercial rights) for

25. See id
26. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-304 (1998) (codified at
scattered sections of 17 and 28 U.S.C.).
27. See U.S. TRADE REP., PROTECTIONOF INTELLECTUALPROPERTY RIGHTS ANDTHE WTO's
TRIPS AGREEMENT, availableat http://www.ustr.gov/html/why.html (last visited May 13, 2004).
28. See Case-Zablocki Act of Aug. 22, 1972, (codified as amended at I U.S.C. § 112a-b
(1972)); see 22 U.S.C. § 2656d(a) (2000).
29. See HANDBOOK ON TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (THE C-175
HANDBOOK) chs. 700-750 (1985); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SUPPLEMENTARY HANDBOOK ON THE C175 PROCESS: ROUTINE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY
HANDBOOK], available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rpts/175/1456.htm (last visited May 12,
2004).
30. This Annex was approved in May 1990 pursuant to Executive Order 12591 of 1987 and
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Section 5171 (b). Exec. Order No. 12,591,
52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987).
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inventions developed jointly in its own country.' The major issue is that

Australia, Canada, and Japan for example have objected to this provision
and feel they are unfairly excluded from the U.S. market. Smaller market
countries such as Australia (population 19 million) and Canada (31
million) have argued that IPRs allocation should depend on the relative
effort of each partner country that has invested in the jointly collaborated
research and development activities.
The equity clause (Article IIB2b) states that IPRs are allocated to the
country whose law protects intellectual property when and if the legal
system of the partner country fails to guarantee such protection adequately
and effectively.32 Developed countries such as Canada, Germany, Italy,
and Japan have objected to this provision on the argument their laws
adequately provide IPR protection similar to those of the United States;
therefore, these countries believe such a clause is unnecessary and
insulting.
In international S&T negotiations, the equity clause and the IPR issue
have become a major challenge to American diplomats and trade
negotiators. The equity clause is a concern to many of America's trading
partners who object to the determination of the "home market" or
territorial allocation of "rights." The heart of the equity clause is related to
areas in which one country's legal framework protects certain kinds of
IPRs, but not others.
When the legal system does not protect a particular right, "all rights"
to IPRs will be allocated to the country whose system has the most legal
protection. In general, however, each country keeps the rights to its home
market where the IPR is created in joint S&T activities.33 American
negotiators also have difficulties in territorial allocation of rights with
countries that have regional cooperation, such as the European Union and
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, and with countries that have a
smaller home market compared to the United States. Those countries
maintain their legal regimes and IPR protections are as strong as those of
the United States and request equal treatment in access to the American
market. When the involved countries have disputes over the equity clause
and IPR issues, the arbitration and dispute settlement clauses 34 may permit
the countries to resolve them under the WTO rules and TRIPS."

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

SUPPLEMENTARY HANDBOOK, supra note 29.

See id.
See id.
See TRIPS, supra note 20.
See SUPPLEMENTARY HANDBOOK, supra note 29.
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B. Model IPR Annex for InternationalScience and
Technology Agreements
Since 1990 U.S. government agencies have incorporated the Model
IPR Annexes in many international S&T agreements. Some agencies in
consultation with the USTR and the Patent and Trade Office, have
developed their own flexible approaches to IPR issues. For example, the
National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) and the
Department of Energy (DOE) have their own "preferred texts" to the 1990
IPR Annex.3 6 In many cases, partner countries had no major difficulties
accepting the American provisions. In other cases, objections to the Model
Annex language resulted in either protracted negotiations or failure to
reach a new agreement. In other instances, significant modifications
followed the 1990 Model IPR Annex. Increasingly, many countries
(including Canada and Japan) and the European Union have raised
questions about the continued utility and applicability of specific language
in the 1990 Annex since these jurisdictions are also members of the WTO.
When the time comes to negotiate for the renewal of S&T agreements
with Australia, Canada, the European Union, Germany, Italy, Japan, and
South Korea, American negotiators, who strictly adhere to the two
provisions in the 1990 Annex, face many challenges. Within the U.S.
government, a number of technical agencies face an increasingly
cumbersome interagency clearance process. The National Research
Council made recommendations to streamline the C- 175 authorization and
to expedite the process for an effective response by the State Department.37
Since recognizing the issues of global competitiveness and the
interagency policy coordination process, the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy and the Department of State have worked
with other government agencies to develop a better mechanism to address
these contested IPR issues.3 8 In this respect, the 2000 IPR Annex allows
a country to have "a right" (as opposed to "rights") to exploit or license

36. See id. app. NASA Annex Option; id. app. DOE Annex Option.
37. National Research Council, The Pervasive Role of Science, Technology, and Health in
Foreign Policy: Imperatives for the State Department 69-79 (1999), available at
http://books.nap.edu/books/0309067855/html/62.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2004). In response to
this 1999 Report, see SUPPLEMENTARY HANDBOOK, supra note 29.

38. To accomplish this, the White House's National Science and Technology Council
(NSTC) and the White House's OSTP were given the mandate to provide the across-the-board
review of S&T policy with budgetary recommendations for agencies like the Department of Energy
and NASA. The NSTC and OSTP also have the authority to formulate U.S. government policies
related to international S&T programs and activities. The NSTC's Committee on International
Science, Engineering and Technology is the central reference point of the U.S. government's
interagency coordination on international S&T agreements and activities. The Assistant to the
President for S&T has the overall responsibility for management of the NSTC and its interagency
working groups.
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intellectual property created in its geographical territory. 9 Inventions
owned by the government through its employees can be licensed under the
Bayh-Dole Act.40

The rapidly evolving globalization of information technology,
nanotechnology, and biotechnology prevents the United States from
enforcing the 1994 TRIPS regimes in every country. Industrialized
countries have better IPR regimes than other developing and less
developed countries. Given global challenges in trade and the environment
(including public health issues, especially related to HIV/AIDS treatments
in Africa and elsewhere), the U.S. government has considered a flexible
IPR framework when entering into S&T agreements with these countries
(e.g., some exceptions are made under the Bayh-Dole Act on a case-bycase basis for "exceptional circumstances"). It is beneficial to coordinate
these exceptions with the USTR in its Special 301 and with the
Department of State for practical and political reasons.
To put in place flexible IPR frameworks, for example, the Department
of Human and Health Services has worked with USTR in countries where
IPR regimes are insufficient or nonexistent for issues related to
HIV/AIDS. It appears the negotiation of IPR issues on a case-by-case basis
may be the most productive approach to reaching international S&T
agreements. Such flexibility is within the purview of the WTO's TRIP
guidelines for greater social and economic welfare as well as for national
security and emergency considerations, particularly in the context of the
global HIV/AIDS pandemic.41
V. STRENGTHENING AMERICAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CAPACITY

The U.S. government, including all executive departments and
technical agencies, demonstrates that its joint S&T research activities with
other countries have mutually benefitted their domestic missions and
promoted America's international trade and economic policy objectives.
Numerous other activities such as technical assistance, formulating rule of
laws, and legal enforcement in developing countries and more recently
with the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union must be
further carried out simultaneously. These long-term "investment"
strategies would enhance their capacity building (and American goodwill
39. See Revised 2000 IPR Annex, in SUPPLEMENTARY HANDBOOK, supra note 29, §
I11 A(2)b.
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 207 (2000).
41. Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement contain provisions not only to protect health
and nutrition but also to promote public interest in sectors that are vital to national development.
BRIAN McDONALD, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND 165-66
(1998).
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abroad) and advance American industrial competitiveness and business
interests abroad. The U.S. Agency for International Development, the
Department of the Treasury, and other technical agencies have played an
important role in this capacity building enterprise, both in institutional and
human resource development. Not only U.S. governmental agencies, but
also nongovernmental entities, the business community, and individuals
must engage in achieving broader American foreign policy and economic
development goals in S&T cooperative agreements and partnerships.
To strengthen S&T capacity, American embassies and other executive
departments and technical agencies must continue to monitor partner
countries' international S&T activities and programs under the U.S.
cooperative agreements and implementing arrangements. The 1987
Executive Order also stipulates the results of overseas S&T research and
development activities must be reported to federal agencies, academic
institutions, and the private sector through the Science and Technology
Reporting Information Dissemination Enhancement (STRIDE) Program.42
Internally, the Department of State must have greater resources
available to ensure that international S&T policies and programs are
developed and implemented to achieve American foreign policy goals and
to take necessary actions to address any deviation from the overall
international economic and trade policy goals. In the past, the allocation
of funding and personnel resources, as well as environmentally driven
policies, appeared to put less importance on S&T aspects of foreign policy.
Yet, the American S&T policy has become a crosscutting issue, imbedded
in many foreign policy and international trade promotion goals. A few
maj or United States embassies have environment, science, and technology
(EST) officers to cover increasingly growing S&T innovations and
controversies. Innovative strategies by the State Department, such as the
science and technology fellowship and exchange programs that place
American scientists in our embassies and the Department's various
bureaus, assist in strengthening S&T capabilities in international
diplomacy.43 Critical global issues such as biodiversity, global climate
change, the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious diseases, genetically

42. See Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987) (establishing the
mechanism known as the STRIDE Program for unclassified reporting), available at
http://www.nttc.edu/products/guide/seca05f html (last visited May 13, 2004). STRIDE, which
stands for Science and Technology Reporting Information Dissemination Enhancement, ensures
that federal agencies and laboratories assist universities and the private sector in broadening our
technology base by moving new knowledge from the research laboratory into the development of
new products and processes. Id.
43. See U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs Web page, available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes (last visited May 27, 2004).
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modified foods and nuclear energy and safety, although challenging to
EST officers, are the driving issues in multilateral diplomacy.
Moreover, U.S. government agencies must engage in more cooperative
activities in other developed and developing countries where science and
technological talents, facilities, and commitments reside to resolve these
global issues. The American involvement in S&T collaborative activities
in less developed countries must be pursued through humanitarian,
defense, and development assistance programs to address global issues that
have a direct link to American national security and international
terrorism. A recent bilateral S&T agreement with Bangladesh illustrates
an example of evolving asymmetrical strategies to assist friendly countries
in capacity building and economic development." The decision to declare
HIV/AIDS as a national security issue during the Clinton Administration
may also demonstrate that American people are vulnerable to the
devastation taking place in other parts of the world, especially Africa, and
increasingly in Asia. In a highly interdependent world, a flexible and
asymmetrical strategic vision is essential for international S&T policy to
better address changing global and domestic security needs.
VI. CONCLUSION

In coming years, global S&T cooperation will open a wide range of
opportunities to advance America's foreign policy and international trade
promotion goals including:
1. By reaching out to scientists, scholars, and technology-minded young
entrepreneurs in other countries, the United States would promote
American idealism and democratic governance because international
S&T activities are a neutral and apolitical instrument for peaceful
change.
2. International S&T collaboration facilitates democratic changes and
promotes open trade with other countries. This would lighten the
American military's mission to protect national security and maintain
global peace.
3. Within the framework of global institutions, American S&T
collaborative agreements help create a better environmental, scientific,
and technological infrastructure in other countries promoting American
business and economic interests and to protecting IPRs and equitable

44. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia signed an umbrella S&T agreement with
Bangladesh on March 1,2003. Media Note: UnitedStates signsScience andTechnologyAgreement
with Bangladesh,Mar. 6,2003, availableathttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/18430.htin (last
visited Mar. 4, 2004).
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access to their markets. This is an extension of the U.S. Constitution
and its enshrined democratic values which can be shared broadly with
other nations.
4. By implementing the Agenda 21 of the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 in
Brazil and subsequently the World Summit on Sustainable
Development of 2002 in Johannesburg in South Africa, the United
States helped efforts to create a series of MEAs that will demand
transnational solutions in science and technology fields. The American
leadership in new geospatial technology, biotechnology, and
nanotechnology will not only promote economic growth domestically
but also enhance the stewardship of the global environment and
sustainable development strategies.
5. By promoting the current status of cooperative S&T agreements, the
United States enhances its ability to deal with global dangers like
terrorism, narcotics, and other criminal activities that threaten our
national security and domestic peace and prosperity.
The instruments of IPR regimes have become a major issue that
continues to arise frequently in international S&T negotiations. Yet, such
agreements foster greater economic welfare, better international
communication and exchanges, higher transparency, and more trust among
partner countries around the world. Thus, S&T agreements offer reliable
confidence and capacity building frameworks for greater national security.
The current IPR provisions, which still pose a challenge to American
negotiators, need to be resolved to gain greater mutual benefits in
cooperative S&T activities. Therefore, to be more competitive in the
global marketplace, a more progressive and balanced IPR regime is
required. This regime would be facilitated by a comprehensive appraisal
of current legislative, policy, and administrative instruments.

